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## The Development of the Imāmī Shī'ī Doctrine of *jihād*

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While the doctrine of *jihād* has attracted the attention of scholars dealing with Sunnī Islam, its position in Imāmī (or Twelver) Shī'ism has remained relatively unexplored.<sup>1</sup> This neglect is unwarranted, particularly in view of the special significance which the Imāmī Shī'is themselves attach to the subject. Hence the following attempt to examine some aspects of this doctrine.

### I

Before embarking on an analysis of the specifically Imāmī views on *jihād*, it should be pointed out that a general similarity exists between Sunnī and Imāmī doctrines on the subject. A particular area of similarity is the great significance which both attach to holy war. Though Imāmī (as well as Sunnī) scholars did not as a rule follow the Khārijī example by officially sanctioning *jihād* as a sixth 'pillar' (*rukn*), they none the less left no doubt as to its importance. Muḥammad b. 'Alī Ibn Bābawayhi (d. 381/991), one of the earliest Imāmī doctors, declares, "*jihād* is a religious duty imposed by God on mankind".<sup>2</sup> The leading Imāmī figure of the Buwayhid period, Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Shaykh al-Mufīd (d. 413/1022), says that *jihād* "maintains the strength of the foundations of Islam",<sup>3</sup> and Abū Ja'far al-Ṭūsī (d. 460/1067) sees in *jihād* "one of the religious duties of Islam and one of its pillars".<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> E. TYAN (art. *Djihād*, EI<sup>2</sup>) has a few observations on the Imāmī position. See also M. KHADDURI: *War and peace in the law of Islam*. Baltimore 1955, pp. 66—68; A. K. S. LAMPTON: *A nineteenth century view of jihād*. In: SI 32 (1970), pp. 181—192. The bibliographies offered by TYAN and KHADDURI deal mainly with *jihād* in Sunnī Islam.

<sup>2</sup> *Al-jihād farīda wājiba min allāh 'alā khalqihī* (Ibn Bābawayhi: *Al-hidāya*. Tehran 1377, p. 11, cit. Muḥammad Bāqir al-Majlisī: *Biḥār al-anwār*. Persia 1305—15 [= *Biḥār*], XXI, p. 93).

<sup>3</sup> *Al-jihād* [...] *tathbutu bihī qawā'id al-islām* (al-Shaykh al-Mufīd: *K. al-irshād*. Tehran 1320, p. 31.)

<sup>4</sup> *Al-jihād farīda min farā'id al-islām wa-rukn min arkānihī* (Abū Ja'far al-Ṭūsī: *Al-nihāya*. Beirut 1970, p. 289). Al-Ṭūsī does not, in this work, use the term *rukn* to refer to any of the other five religious duties which are normally called *arkān*.

These and similar statements are based on a wealth of traditions ascribed to the Prophet or to the Imams. Muḥammad al-Bāqir (d. 114/732 or 117/735) and Ja'far al-Ṣādiq (d. 148/765), the fifth and sixth Imams, are cited as authorities for the following utterance: "the root of Islam is prayer, its branch is alms-giving, and the top of its hump<sup>5</sup> *jihād* for the cause of God."<sup>6</sup> The Prophet is quoted as describing prayer, charitable piety (*birr*) and *jihād* as the three works most beloved by God.<sup>7</sup> In other sayings, *jihād* is counted as one of four,<sup>8</sup> five,<sup>9</sup> six,<sup>10</sup> eight,<sup>11</sup> or ten<sup>12</sup> elements which constitute the Islamic faith. All that is good is embodied in the sword;<sup>13</sup> death in a holy war atones for all sins. (However, to die, even in a holy war, with outstanding debts for which no one would be responsible, is a sin.)<sup>14</sup> Those who die in a *jihād* will enter Paradise through a special gate;<sup>15</sup> conversely, those who try to save their skins

<sup>5</sup> Or, according to a variant reading, "its peak and its hump" (*dhurwatu-hū wa-sanāmuhū*).

<sup>6</sup> *Aṣluhu 'l-ṣalāt wa-far'uhu 'l-zakāt wa-dhurwatu sanāmihi 'l-jihād fī sabīl allāh* (Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Barqī: *K. al-mahāsīn*. Ed. MUḤ. ṢĀDIQ BAḤR AL-'ULŪM. Najaf 1964, p. 233; Muḥammad b. Ya'qūb al-Kulīnī: *Uṣūl al-kāfi*. Ed. 'ALĪ AKBAR AL-GHAFFĀRĪ. Tehran 1375—7, II, pp. 23—24, cit. *Bihār*, XV/i, p. 193; al-Qāḍī al-Nu'mān: *Da'ā'im al-islām*. Ed. A. A. A. FYZEE. I. Cairo 1963, p. 403). See also A. J. WENSINCK: *Concordance et indices de la tradition musulmane*. T. 1—7. Leiden 1936-69, s.v. *jihād*: *ra's al-amr al-islām wa-'amūduhu 'l-ṣalāt wa-dhurwatu sanāmihi 'l-jihād*. Cf. I. GOLDZIEHER: *Muslim studies*. Ed. S. M. STERN. II. London 1971, p. 354, n. 2.

<sup>7</sup> Al-Barqī, op. cit., p. 235; Ibn Bābawayhi: *K. al-khiṣāl*. Ed. 'ALĪ AKBAR AL-GHAFFĀRĪ. Tehran 1389, pp. 163, 185, cit. *Bihār*, XXI, p. 94.

<sup>8</sup> In a saying attributed to 'Alī. See al-Qāḍī al-Nu'mān, op. cit., I, p. 403; Ḥaydar Āmulī: *Jāmi' al-asrār*. Ed. H. CORBIN and O. ISMĀ'ĪL YAḤYĀ. Tehran and Paris 1969, p. 598; *Bihār*, XV/i, p. 198.

<sup>9</sup> In a tradition of the Prophet; the other four being prayer, fasting, alms-giving, pilgrimage. See Ḥaydar Āmulī, op. cit., p. 591.

<sup>10</sup> Ibn Bābawayhi: *Al-hidāya*, p. 12.

<sup>11</sup> Ibn Bābawayhi: *Amālī*. Ed. ḤASAN AL-MŪSAWĪ AL-KHURSĀN. Najaf 1970, p. 303, on the authority of the tenth Imam, 'Alī al-Naqī (d. 254/868). The eight duties are devotion to the Imams (*walāya*), prayer, alms-giving, fasting, pilgrimage, *jihād*, enjoining what is good, prohibiting what is evil.

<sup>12</sup> *Buniya 'l-islām 'alā 'asharati ashum* [...] (Ibn Bābawayhi: *K. al-khiṣāl*, p. 447, cit. *Bihār*, XV/i, p. 207; cf. id.: *'Ilal al-sharā'i'*. Ed. MUḤ. ṢĀDIQ BAḤR AL-'ULŪM. Najaf 1966, p. 249).

<sup>13</sup> *Al-khayr kulluhū fī 'l-sayf wa-taḥta ḡill al-sayf* (*Bihār*, XXI, p. 94, quoting a tradition of the Prophet).

<sup>14</sup> Ibn Bābawayhi: *K. al-khiṣāl*, p. 12; id.: *'Ilal al-sharā'i'*, p. 528.

<sup>15</sup> Ibn Bābawayhi: *Ma'ānī 'l-akhbār*. Ed. 'ALĪ AKBAR AL-GHAFFĀRĪ. Tehran 1379, p. 309, cit. *Bihār*, VIII, p. 699. See also *Bihār*, VIII, p. 682, XXI, p. 93.

by running away from the battle-field (*al-firār min al-zaḥf*) are guilty of a grave sin (*kabīra*) and will be punished.<sup>16</sup>

As in Sunnī Islam,<sup>17</sup> so too in Imāmī Shī'ism, the term *jihād* does not merely refer to warfare, but is often broadened to include various meritorious acts requiring spiritual or physical exertion. Of these acts, perhaps the most famous is the so-called "greater *jihād*" (*al-jihād al-akbar*), which, in contrast to the "lesser *jihād*" (*al-jihād al-aṣghar*), involves a struggle not against hostile outside forces but against one's own baser instincts (*jihād al-nafs*).<sup>18</sup> True *jihād* is also said to consist in striving for knowledge ('*ilm*),<sup>19</sup> or in keeping the secrets of the Shī'ī religion.<sup>20</sup>

*Jihād* is described in a Shī'ī tradition as comprising four parts or "branches" (*shu'ab*): *jihād al-nafs*, struggle against attacking unbelievers (i.e. defensive war), struggle against an enemy (referring probably to a Muslim offensive), and struggle to revive a dormant or neglected custom of the Prophet and the early generations (*iḥyā' sunna*).<sup>21</sup>

Other virtues are sometimes ranked above that of fighting in a holy war: thus Muḥammad is said to have declared that on the Day of Judgment the ink of the scholars will outweigh the blood of the martyrs on the scales,<sup>22</sup> and that the *mu'adhdhin* will receive a reward equalling

<sup>16</sup> Furāt b. Ibrāhīm al-Kūfī: *Tafsīr*. Najaf 1354, p. 33 (on the authority of Ja'far al-Ṣādiq); Ibn Bābawayhi: *Man lā yaḥḍuruḥu 'l-ḥajj*. Ed. ḤASAN AL-MŪSAWĪ AL-KHURSĀN. Najaf 1378, III, p. 370; id.: *Ṭal al-sharā'ī*, pp. 392, 474-475, 481. This is also the Sunnī doctrine; see e.g. al-Dhahabī: *K. al-kabā'ir*. Ed. MUḤ. 'ABD AL-RAZZĀQ ḤAMZA. Mecca 1355, pp. 77—78.

<sup>17</sup> For which see especially the discussion in GOLDZIEHER, op. cit., II, pp. 350—354 (where Sunnī sources are quoted for some of the traditions mentioned below).

<sup>18</sup> See al-Kulīnī: *Furū' al-kāfi*. Ed. 'ALĪ AKBAR AL-GHAFFĀRĪ. Tehran 1375—7, V, p. 12; Ibn Bābawayhi: *Amālī*, p. 418; id.: *Ma'āni 'l-akhbār*, p. 160; al-Shaykh al-Mufīd: *K. al-ikhtisāṣ*. Ed. 'ALĪ AKBAR AL-GHAFFĀRĪ. Tehran 1379, p. 240; al-Majlisī: *Ayn al-ḥayāt*. Tehran 1373, p. 271; *Bihār*, XV/ii, p. 40. According to Ismā'īlī doctrine, the *jihād al-nafs* is the prerogative of "those who possess the necessary qualifications of '*ilm* and '*amal*, i.e. theoretical education and practical religious training" (N. Ivanow: *A creed of the Faṭimids*. Bombay 1936, p. 59). For the Ṣūfī position cf. B. REINERT: *Die Lehre vom tawakkul in der klassischen Sufik*. Berlin 1968, pp. 82ff.

<sup>19</sup> Ibn Bābawayhi, *Amālī*, p. 551.

<sup>20</sup> *Wa-kitmān sirrinā jihād fī sabīl allāh* (al-Mufīd: *Amālī*. Najaf 1351, p. 200, on the authority of Ja'far al-Ṣādiq).

<sup>21</sup> Ibn Bābawayhi: *Al-hidāya*, pp. 11—12, cit. *Bihār*, XXI, p. 93; al-Kulīnī, op. cit., V, p. 9. See also Ibn Bābawayhi: *K. al-khiṣāl*, p. 240, cit. *Bihār*, XXI, p. 97. For a different four-partite division of *jihād* see Ḥaydar Āmulī, op. cit., p. 599; *Bihār*, XV/i, p. 199.

<sup>22</sup> Ibn Bābawayhi: *Amālī*, p. 149, on the authority of Ja'far al-Ṣādiq.

that of 40,000 martyrs.<sup>23</sup> In another tradition the Prophet is quoted as ordering one of his followers to refrain from going on a *jihād* if his old parents would rather enjoy his company at home.<sup>24</sup> As GOLDZIEHER has pointed out,<sup>25</sup> these and similar traditions reflect the reaction of Muslim scholars against the fanatical urge to court death in battle (*talab al-shahāda*), as exemplified above all by the Khārijīs. Such traditions spring from a common Sunnī-Shī'ī heritage, and cannot in themselves be cited as proof of any specifically Shī'ī reluctance to embrace the cause of holy war.

## II

Some Imāmī traditions on *jihād* reflect the typically Shī'ī view of history as a series of wrongful acts perpetrated against the Shī'ā. This view is epitomised by the Shī'ī Imams being referred to as *mazlūmūn*, i.e. the victims of evil and injustice. It also explains the following Shī'ī justification of *jihād*: all believers (i.e. Shī'īs) are by definition *mazlūmūn*, since they have been robbed of their rightful property, the territory at present held by the unbelievers (the *dār al-ḥarb*). Hence believers at all times are called upon to go on a *jihād*, and this is the meaning of the verse, "those who are fighting have permission [to do so], since they have been unjustly dealt with" (*Qur'ān* 22/39(40)).<sup>26</sup>

The close connection between *jihād* and justice is also established in some Shī'ī legal texts, in which the portion dealing with the rules governing holy war includes a section on "enjoining what is good and prohibiting what is evil" (*al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf wa'l-nahy 'an al-munkar*).<sup>27</sup> Al-Shaykh al-Mufid, who stresses that this activity is a *farḍ kifāya* (collective duty), explains that it springs from the belief in justice and in the imamate.<sup>28</sup> Since the Mu'tazilis regarded *al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf wa'l-nahy*

<sup>23</sup> *Alā wa-man adhdhana muḥtasiban yurīdu bi-dhālīka wajh allāh 'azza wa-jalla a'āhu 'lāh thawāb arba'in alf shahīd wa-arba'in alf ṣiddīq* (Ibn Bābawayhi: *Amālī*, p. 388, on the authority of the Prophet).

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 413. Cf. QUERRY: *Droit musulman*. Paris 1871—2, I, p. 322; WENSINCK: *Handbook*, s.v. "War"; KHADDURI, op. cit., p. 86.

<sup>25</sup> GOLDZIEHER, op. cit., II, p. 352.

<sup>26</sup> Al-Kulīnī, op. cit., V, pp. 16—18; al-Qādī al-Nu'mān, op. cit., I, p. 439.

<sup>27</sup> See e.g. al-Kulīnī, op. cit., V, pp. 55—60; al-Tūsī: *Al-nihāya*, p. 299; QUERRY, op. cit., I, pp. 354—356; Najm al-Dīn al-Ḥillī: *Al-mukhtaṣar al-nāfi'*. Tehran 1387, p. 139; Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī: *Tabṣīrat al-muta'allimīn* (with the *Sharḥ* of Ṣādiq Mahdī al-Ḥusaynī). I. Najaf 1382, pp. 298 ff. Cf. 'Alī b. Ibrāhīm al-Qummī: *Tafsīr*. Ed. ṬAYYIB AL-MŪSAWĪ AL-JAZĀ'IRĪ. Najaf 1386—7, I, p. 306 (ad *Qur'ān* 9/112(113)), where *al-āmīrūn bi'l-ma'rūf wa'l-nāhūn 'an al-munkar* are said to be the Imams.

<sup>28</sup> Al-Shaykh al-Mufid: *Awā'il al-maqālāt*. Ed. FAḌL ALLĀH AL-ZANJĀNĪ. Tabriz 1371, p. 98.

'*an al-munkar* as one of their principal tenets,<sup>29</sup> there is little doubt as to their influence on this aspect of Shī'ī thought. Indeed, considerable similarity exists between the formulations on this subject made by the pro-Shī'ī Mu'tazilī al-Ṣāḥib b. 'Abbād (d. 385/995) and the celebrated Shī'ī theologian al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā (d. 436/1044). Al-Ṣāḥib declares that the doctrine of enjoining what is good and prohibiting what is evil is obligatory "as far as possible",<sup>30</sup> and al-Murtaḍā makes the same point in saying that it is obligatory "as long as it does not lead to *fasād* (i.e. evil and corruption)".<sup>31</sup>

### III

The Imāmī Shī'ī rules relating to *jihād* are often very similar to those of the various Sunnī schools. Imāmī doctors, for example, agree with their Sunnī counterparts in defining the duty of *jihād* as a *farq kifāya*, which may however turn into a *farq 'ayn* (individual duty) in case of a grave danger to the community.<sup>32</sup> Both Sunnīs and Imāmīs discuss *ribāṭ* (or *murābaṭa*), which is an essentially defensive concept, within the general context of *jihād*.<sup>33</sup> Both list certain categories of persons who are exempt from the duty of fighting a holy war (for instance women, children, old persons, slaves, the insane and the sick).<sup>34</sup>

There are, however, within the Imāmī legal theory, specifically Imāmī elements which differ from the Sunnī system. These revolve around two major issues: the identity of the person who leads the *jihād*, and the enemies against whom *jihād* may be waged. Even on these two issues, Imāmī doctrine appears at first sight to bear a considerable resemblance to the Sunnī position: Sunnī and Imāmī doctors agree that leadership of the *jihād* is one of the duties and prerogatives of the ruler, or Imam;

<sup>29</sup> See e.g. Ibn al-Murtaḍā: *Ṭabaqāt al-mu'tazila*. Ed. S. DIWALD-WILZER. Wiesbaden 1961, p. 8.

<sup>30</sup> Al-Ṣāḥib b. 'Abbād: *Al-ibāna 'an madhhab ahl al-'adl*. In: *Nafā'is al-makhtūṭāt*. I. Ed. MUḤ. ḤASAN ĀL YĀSĪN. Baghdad 1963<sup>2</sup>, p. 27; id.: *K. al-tadhkira fi 'l-uṣūl al-khamsa*, loc. cit. II. Baghdad 1954, p. 94.

<sup>31</sup> Al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā: *Muqaddima fi 'l-uṣūl al-i'tiqādiyya*; loc. cit., II, p. 82.

<sup>32</sup> Al-Qāḍī al-Nu'mān, op. cit., I, p. 401, cit. *Bihār*, XXI, p. 105; al-Ṭūsī: *Al-nihāya*, p. 289; id.: *K. al-khilāf*. Najaf 1376, p. 229; QUERRY, op. cit., I, p. 321; Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, op. cit., I, p. 279; al-Majlisī: *Risāla fi 'l-i'tiqāḍāt*. Persia 1321, p. 492; KHADDURI, op. cit., p. 60.

<sup>33</sup> Al-Qāḍī al-Nu'mān, op. cit., I, p. 405; al-Ṭūsī: *Al-nihāya*, p. 290; QUERRY, op. cit., I, p. 323; Najm al-Dīn al-Ḥillī: *Al-mukhtaṣar al-nāfi'*, p. 133. According to Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (op. cit., I, p. 281), the reward for *murābaṭa* lasting over 40 days equals the reward for *jihād*.

<sup>34</sup> Al-Qāḍī al-Nu'mān, op. cit., I, p. 402; al-Ṭūsī, op. cit., p. 289; Najm al-Dīn al-Ḥillī, loc. cit.; Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, op. cit., I, pp. 279—280.

and both state that *jihād* may be directed against polytheists, apostates, scripturaries (*ahl al-kitāb*, i.e. Jews, Christians, Sabians, Zoroastrians) and *ahl al-baghy* (or *bughāt*, i.e. dissenters who act wrongfully or unjustly).<sup>35</sup>

The uniqueness of the classical Imāmī theory lies, first, in the fact that it limits leadership of the *jihād* to one of twelve divinely appointed Imams, or to a representative chosen by the Imam to perform that function on his behalf.<sup>36</sup>

Secondly, the position of the *ahl-al baghy* in Imāmī legal theory is altogether different from their position in Sunnī *fiqh*. This difference applies both to the definition of the term *ahl al-baghy* and to the importance which is attached to *jihād* against them. In Sunnī Islam, the *ahl al-baghy* are those who oppose the legitimate ruler; the duty to fight them assumed particular significance whenever the government in power felt threatened by hostile Muslim elements, whether internal or external. Thus al-Māwardī (d. 450/1058) stressed the ruler's right to fight the *ahl al-baghy* at a moment when the 'Abbāsīd caliphate had reached its nadir and was largely at the mercy of the Shī'ī Buwayhids;<sup>37</sup> and the Syrian atābeg Nūr al-Dīn (ruled 541/1146—569/1174) whipped up popular support for the *jihād* against the *ahl al-baghy* (by which he meant especially the Shī'ī and Ismā'īlī heterodoxies) as part of his overall strategy of reviving enthusiasm for *jihād* in general in the context of the struggle against the Crusaders.<sup>38</sup> On the whole, however, the first priority was reserved in Sunnī Islam for the holy war against the infidels.

The Imāmīs, on the other hand, define the *ahl al-baghy* as those who rise against one of the twelve legitimate Imams; and the duty to fight them is a central tenet, which is not contingent upon any particular historical occurrence. For while the Imāmīs concurred in the need to fight the infidels, they regarded as an essential first step the conversion of all Muslims into true believers (i.e. Imāmī Shī'īs); or, to put it in Imāmī legal terminology: the struggle to convert the *dār al-islām* into *dār al-īmān* must precede the final onslaught on the *dār al-kufr*.<sup>39</sup> The term *dār al-islām* here means those areas ruled by Muslims who did not accept, and often fought against, the imamate of 'Alī and his descen-

<sup>35</sup> Al-Qādī al-Nu'mān, op. cit., I, pp. 438 ff.; al-Tūsī, op. cit., pp. 291—299; QUERRY, op. cit., I, p. 324; Najm al-Dīn al-Ḥillī, op. cit., pp. 134—136; KHADDURI, op. cit., pp. 74 ff.

<sup>36</sup> On this point see below, p. 80.

<sup>37</sup> Al-Māwardī: *Al-aḥkām al-sultāniyya*. Ed. M. ENGER. Bonn 1853, p. 89.

<sup>38</sup> E. SIVAN: *L'Islam et la croisade*. Paris 1968, pp. 71—73.

<sup>39</sup> For this three-partite division into *dār al-īmān*, *dār al-islām* and *dār al-kufr* see al-Shaykh al-Mufīd: *Awā'il al-maqālāt*, pp. 70—71.

dants; these Muslims were therefore, by definition, identical with the *ahl al-baghy*.

References to *jihād* against *ahl al-baghy* in Imāmī literature probably outnumber references to other kinds of *jihād*; in Imāmī *fiqh* works the *ahl al-baghy* are occasionally listed even before the other categories of enemies.<sup>40</sup> This is hardly surprising: the *ahl al-baghy*, after all, represent the entire hateful Sunnī world, a world held responsible for all the harassment and persecution to which the Shī'īs were subjected throughout the ages.

#### IV

Of the twelve Imams, only 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib reached a position of power which enabled him to confront directly the threat posed by the *ahl al-baghy*; his conduct towards them lies therefore at the heart of all Imāmī thinking on the subject. In Imāmī tradition, 'Alī's role in combatting the enemies of Islam is referred back to the time of the Prophet. Muḥammad is said to have declared that just as he, Muḥammad, and the believers of his generation were destined to fight the polytheists, so 'Alī and the believers in his time would have to wage a *jihād* "against people who, though formally acknowledging God's unity and Muḥammad's apostleship, would nevertheless introduce harmful innovations, would persecute the Prophet's family (*'itra*), and would cause dissension".<sup>41</sup> A similar idea is contained in Imāmī interpretations of the verse, "oh Prophet, fight the unbelievers and the hypocrites (*munāfiqūn*)" (*Qur'ān* 9/73(74), 66/9). This verse was somewhat problematic, since it was known that Muḥammad did not actually fight against the hypocrites; and the Imāmī interpretation is that the Prophet fought against the unbelievers and 'Alī against the hypocrites.<sup>42</sup> Ibn 'Abbās is quoted as the authority

<sup>40</sup> This is done for example by Najm al-Dīn al-Ḥillī (both in his *Sharā'i' al-islām* (trans. QUERRY) and in the abridged version, i.e. *Al-mukhtaṣar al-nāfi'*), but not by Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (op. cit., I, pp. 281 ff.), where the order is: (i) *ahl al-dhīmma*; (ii) other unbelievers; (iii) the *bughāt*. Al-Qādi al-Nu'mān lists the *ahl al-baghy* after the *mushrikūn* (op. cit., I, pp. 438, 452); this is also the procedure followed by al-Ṭūsī in his *Nihāya* (pp. 291, 296). In the case of al-Ṭūsī this may be attributed to *taqiyya* (precautionary dissimulation): al-Ṭūsī was still alive during the Saljuq occupation of Baghdad (447/1055), and suffered persecution at the hands of the Sunnī rulers.

<sup>41</sup> Al-Mufīd: *Amālī*, p. 169; *Bihār*, VIII, p. 445.

<sup>42</sup> 'Alī b. Ibrāhīm al-Qummī, op. cit., II, p. 377, cit. *Bihār*, VIII, p. 147. Most Sunnī commentators explain that 'Alī's *jihād* against the *munāfiqūn* consisted of threats that they would go to hell, or of the carrying out of the prescribed Quranic punishments (*ḥudūd*) whenever necessary. A different Shī'ī solution to the problem inherent in this verse is provided by the reading (*qirā'a*), "fight the unbelievers by means of the hypocrites" (*jāhidi*



for the following tradition: "when the verse, 'oh Prophet, fight the unbelievers and the hypocrites' was revealed, the Prophet said, 'I will fight the Amalekites', referring to the unbelievers and the hypocrites. So Gabriel came down to him and said, 'either you or 'Alī [will fight them]'.<sup>43</sup> Muḥammad, then, thought that he would fight all his opponents; Gabriel corrected him, pointing out that some of these opponents would be combatted by 'Alī. 'Alī's *jihād* is thus presented as an extension and continuation of Muḥammad's own *jihād*.

The first occasion on which 'Alī had to fight enemies within the Muslim camp was at the Battle of the Camel (Jumādā II 36/December 656), which took place near Baṣra shortly after 'Alī's accession. In that battle, 'Alī and his supporters were pitted against the combined forces of 'Ā'isha, Ṭalḥa, al-Zubayr and their followers. Sunnī traditionists view the Battle of the Camel, as well as the other civil wars fought during 'Alī's reign, as internal disputes within the community, for which no side was to blame. These traditionists neither present these wars as *jihād*, nor do they represent 'Alī as viewing them as such. The Imāmīs, on the other hand, stress that from the moment 'Alī realised the inevitability of war against 'Ā'isha and her camp, he regarded that war as *jihād* and expressed himself accordingly. On his way from Medina to Baṣra, for instance, he reportedly made a brief stop at al-Rabadha, whence he despatched letters to the Kūfians urging them to join the *jihād*.<sup>44</sup> He is also said to have appealed to Abū Mūsā al-Ash'arī to participate in the *jihād*, but without success.<sup>45</sup> From al-Rabadha 'Alī marched to Dhū Qār, whence he allegedly sent the Kūfians another appeal to join him, while reminding them of the importance of holy war: "God has imposed on us the obligation to wage *jihād*; he has made *jihād* glorious, and has made participation in it a sign of support for Him. By God, it is only through *jihād* that worldly or religious affairs have ever prospered."<sup>46</sup> 'Alī is

<sup>43</sup> *l-kuffār bi'l-munāfiqīn* (instead of *wa'l-munāfiqīn*). See A. JEFFERY: *Materials for the history of the text of the Qur'ān*. Leiden 1937, p. 103 (the codex of Ibn Mas'ūd ad *Qur'ān* 66/9); 'Alī b. Ibrāhīm al-Qummī, op. cit., I, p. 301; al-Faḍl b. al-Ḥasan al-Ṭabarsī: *Majma' al-bayān*. Beirut 1954—7, X, p. 100, XXVIII, p. 128, whence *Bihār*, VIII, p. 147.

<sup>44</sup> *Bihār*, VIII, p. 454 (quoting from al-Ṭūsī's *Amālī*).

<sup>45</sup> *Bihār*, VIII, p. 409 (quoting from the *Sharḥ nahj al-balāgha* of Ibn Abi 'l-Ḥadīd).

<sup>46</sup> Al-Mufīd: *K. al-jamal* (also known as *Al-naṣra fī ḥarb al-Baṣra*). Najaf 1368, pp. 114ff.

<sup>47</sup> *Ammā ba'du fa-inna 'llāha ta'ālā farada 'l-jihād wa-'azzamahū wa-ja'a-lahū nuṣratan lahū; wa'llāhī mā ṣalāhat dunyā qaṭṭu wa-lā dīn illā bihī* (al-Mufīd: *K. al-irshād*, pp. 118—119, cit. *Bihār*, VIII, p. 416; cf. al-Mufīd: *K. al-jamal*, pp. 123—125).

reported to have called the war against his enemies "the pure *jihād*" (*al-jihād al-ṣāfi*), since it was untainted by any doubts or misgivings.<sup>47</sup>

'Alī's supporters in the Battle of the Camel are identified in Imāmi traditions with believers waging a holy war. Muḥammad is said to have prophesied that 70,000 *shahīds* would be killed at Baṣra, all of whom would attain the same rank as the *shahīds* of Badr; and 'Alī is quoted as declaring that "those who kill 'Alī's enemies are blessed; and so also are those who are killed by them, for their entry into Paradise is assured".<sup>48</sup> In a similar vein, 'Alī's son al-Ḥasan is quoted as having declared that "*jihād* with 'Alī is the same as *jihād* with the Prophet".<sup>49</sup>

Both during and after the Battle of the Camel 'Alī is said to have shown great mercy towards his enemies: he ordered that their lives be spared if they were wounded or were attempting to flee the battle-field, and forbade any infringement of the sanctity of their homes and any molestation of their women.<sup>50</sup> 'Alī's leniency towards the Baṣrans was the subject of a letter which he is said to have sent to his Kūfī supporters after the battle.<sup>51</sup>

The Battle of the Camel did not significantly alter the position of 'Alī's opponents, led by Mu'āwiya b. Abī Sufyān, and 'Alī came to realise that the Syrian opposition could not be overcome by peaceful means. The Battle of Ṣiffīn (Ṣafar 37/July 657), in which the armies of 'Alī and Mu'āwiya met in bloody conflict, is also regarded by Shi'ī traditionists as a *jihād*. Before the battle, 'Alī is said to have urged the reluctant Kūfians in speech after speech to join him in a *jihād* against the Syrians.<sup>52</sup> In 'Alī's view, Mu'āwiya and his men had not really converted to Islam; in their hearts they persisted in unbelief, and when they found supporters they made their unbelief public (*aẓharūhū*).<sup>53</sup> In a letter to 'Abd Allāh b. 'Abbās, 'Alī reportedly urged him to excite people's desire for the struggle against Mu'āwiya (*wa-raqhghibhum fi 'l-jihād*),<sup>54</sup> and in

<sup>47</sup> *Bihār*, VIII, p. 448 (quoting from the *Sharḥ nahj al-balāgha* of Ibn Mītham al-Bahrānī).

<sup>48</sup> *Bihār*, VIII, p. 447 (quoting the same source).

<sup>49</sup> Al-Mufid: *K. al-jamal*, p. 126.

<sup>50</sup> Al-Mufid, op. cit., p. 166; al-Kishshī: *K. al-rijāl*. Ed. AHMAD AL-ḤUSAYNĪ. Najaf c. 1964, p. 190, cit. *Bihār*, XXI, p. 98; *Bihār*, VIII, p. 438 (quoting from al-Nu'mānī's *K. al-ghayba*).

<sup>51</sup> Al-Mufid: *K. al-irshād*, p. 122, cit.. *Bihār*, VIII, p. 442. Cf. al-Mufid: *K. al-jamal*, pp. 195ff.

<sup>52</sup> Ibn Abī 'l-Ḥadīd: *Sharḥ nahj al-balāgha*. Ed. MUḤ. ABU 'L-FADL IBRĀHĪM. Cairo 1959—64, VII, p. 70 (*istanfartukum li'l-jihād fa-lam tanfirū*). Cf. al-Mufid: *K. al-irshād*, pp. 125, 128, 130, whence *Bihār*, VIII, p. 472.

<sup>53</sup> Ibn Abī 'l-Ḥadīd, op. cit., XV, p. 114, cit. *Bihār*, VIII, p. 460.

<sup>54</sup> Naṣr b. Muzāhim al-Minqarī: *Waq'at Ṣiffīn*. Ed. 'ABD AL-SALĀM MUḤ. HĀRŪN. Cairo 1365, p. 130, cit. *Bihār*, VIII, p. 476.

another letter, to Mikhnaf b. Sulaym (his governor in Iṣfahān and Hamadān), he is quoted as writing, "it is a religious duty (*farīda*), incumbent upon all men of true knowledge, to wage a *jihād* against those who deliberately strayed from the truth, and who preferred instead to fall into a slumber of blindness and error".<sup>55</sup> One of 'Alī's most loyal supporters, Qays b. Sa'd b. 'Ubāda, is said to have declared that *jihād* against Mu'āwiya was more important than *jihād* against the Turks and the Byzantines.<sup>56</sup> At Ṣiffīn, as in the Battle of the Camel, those who died while fighting for 'Alī are regarded as *shahīds*. Perhaps the most famous of these is 'Ammār b. Yāsir, who was allegedly told by the Prophet that he would be killed by "the rebel band" (*al-fi'a al-bāghiya*).<sup>57</sup>

Imāmī sources present conflicting accounts of 'Alī's behaviour towards his enemies at Ṣiffīn. According to some reports, he showed considerable leniency by freeing all prisoners (except those who had killed one or more of his followers), and by forbidding any maltreatment of women, even when they vilified his men.<sup>58</sup> But other reports have it that 'Alī killed both the wounded and those trying to flee.<sup>59</sup>

The Battle of Ṣiffīn ended in virtual stalemate, and 'Alī continued to regard the struggle against Mu'āwiya as a religious obligation. After Mu'āwiya's envoys had assassinated Ḥassān b. Ḥassān, who had been appointed by 'Alī as governor of al-Anbār, 'Alī is said to have delivered a speech to his troops in which he extolled *jihād* as one of the gates to Paradise reserved by God for His most loyal supporters; he who forsook *jihād* would suffer ignominy and disgrace. In his speech 'Alī is said to have strongly upbraided his followers<sup>60</sup> for trying to conceal their reluctance to fight Mu'āwiya by inventing flimsy excuses (e.g., in winter it was too cold, in summer too hot to fight).<sup>61</sup>

In contrast to 'Alī's uncompromising attitude towards Mu'āwiya, Shī'ī traditionists quote some conciliatory remarks allegedly made by him

<sup>55</sup> Al-Minqarī, op. cit., p. 116, cit. *Bihār*, VIII, p. 475.

<sup>56</sup> Al-Minqarī, op. cit., p. 104.

<sup>57</sup> See e.g. al-Minqarī, op. cit., p. 367; al-Nasā'ī: *Khaṣā'is amīr al-mu'minīn*. Najaf 1369, pp. 59—61; al-Qādī al-Nu'mān, op. cit., I, p. 459; Ibn Bābawayhi: *Uyūn akhbār al-Riḍā*. Ed. ḤASAN AL-MŪSAWĪ AL-KHURSĀN. Najaf 1970, II, p. 63, cit. *Bihār*, VI, p. 749.

<sup>58</sup> Al-Minqarī, op. cit., pp. 230, 595, whence Ibn Abi 'l-Ḥadīd, op. cit., XV, p. 104, *Bihār*, VIII, p. 102.

<sup>59</sup> Al-Kishshī, op. cit., p. 190, cit. *Bihār*, XXI, p. 98; al-Kulinī, op. cit., V, p. 33, cit. *Bihār*, VIII, p. 622.

<sup>60</sup> E.g., "oh you who resemble men but aren't" (*yā ashbāh al-rijāl wa-lā rijāl*).

<sup>61</sup> Ibn Bābawayhi: *Ma'āni 'l-akhbār*, p. 309, cit. *Bihār*, VIII, p. 699; al-Qādī al-Nu'mān, op. cit., I, p. 455; al-Mufid: *K. al-irshād*, pp. 131—134; Ibn Abi 'l-Ḥadīd, op. cit., II, pp. 74—75.

about the Khārijīs. ‘Alī is said to have been unwilling initially to take up arms against them.<sup>62</sup> He is also quoted as declaring: “if they forsake the *jamā’a* or rise against a just ruler (*imām*), then fight them; but if they rise against an unjust ruler, do not fight them, for they have legitimate grounds for this”.<sup>63</sup> ‘Alī is even quoted as saying, “do not kill the Khārijīs after my death; for those who erred while searching for the truth [sc. the Khārijīs] are to be distinguished from those who looked for falsehood and found it [sc. Mu‘āwiya and his camp]”.<sup>64</sup> The famous theologian Muḥammad Bāqir al-Majlisī (d. 1110/1699), feeling that ‘Alī could not have meant that the struggle against the Khārijīs should cease forever, interprets ‘Alī’s attitude as referring only to the period in which Mu‘āwiya and his ilk (*wa-adrābuhū*) were in power. In al-Majlisī’s view, the Khārijīs were more sincere in their worship of God than Mu‘āwiya, and were less sinful than he was. Therefore, while both had to be combated, the *jihād* against Mu‘āwiya was the more important.<sup>65</sup>

Such differences in degree notwithstanding, it is clear that all ‘Alī’s enemies, whether at Baṣra, Ṣiffīn, or Nahrawān, are regarded by Imāmī doctors as *bughāt*. To this category belong not only ‘Alī’s active opponents, but also men such as Abū Mūsā al-Ash‘ari and his followers, who refused to take sides and did not respond to ‘Alī’s pleas for support.<sup>66</sup>

Two main issues are examined by Imāmī doctors as regards the *bughāt*. The first relates to their religious position, and on this a wide measure of agreement seems to have been reached. The Shī‘ī philosopher, historian and politician Naṣir al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274), who generally followed the views expounded by al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā in his *Kitāb al-shāfi*, sums up the prevailing doctrine when he declares, “those who fought ‘Alī were unbelievers and those who disobeyed him were grave sinners”.<sup>67</sup> This view is echoed by al-Ṭūsī’s pupil, al-‘Allāma Ḥasan b. Yūsuf Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d. 726/1325), who asserts in his authoritative commentary on his master’s work (the *Sharḥ al-tajrīd*): “anyone who fought ‘Alī was an unbeliever”.<sup>68</sup> This assertion clearly refers to “the breakers of covenants,

<sup>62</sup> *Bihār*, VIII, p. 600.

<sup>63</sup> *Bihār*, VIII, p. 620, XXI, p. 97.

<sup>64</sup> *Bihār*, VIII, p. 620.

<sup>65</sup> *Bihār*, VIII, p. 621. For an example of a much harsher attitude displayed by ‘Alī towards the Khārijīs see al-Qādī al-Nu‘mān, op. cit., I, p. 458. According to some Sunnī authorities, ‘Alī did not declare a *jihād* against the Khārijīs because of their small numbers. See KHADDURI, op. cit., p. 78.

<sup>66</sup> Cf. *Bihār*, VIII, p. 460.

<sup>67</sup> *Muḥāribū ‘Alī kafara wa-mukhālīfuhū fasaqa (Tajrīd al-‘aqā’id*, cit. Ibn Ma‘šūm: *Al-darajāt al-rafi‘a*. Ed. MUḤ. ṢĀDIQ BAḤR AL-‘ULŪM. Najaf 1382, p. 33).

<sup>68</sup> Ibn Ma‘šūm, op. cit., pp. 33—34.

the deviators, and the renegades" (*al-nākithūn wa'l-qāsiṭūn wa'l-māri-qūn*), referring to 'Alī's enemies at Baṣra, Ṣiffīn and al-Nahrawān respectively.<sup>69</sup> Of these enemies, Mu'āwiya and his followers are considered the most vicious, hence their unbelief is more forcefully emphasised than that of the other groups.

The identification of the *bughāt* as unbelievers (*kuffār*) leads directly to the second issue, which is of a legal rather than a religious nature: are these *bughāt* to be treated in exactly the same fashion as other unbelievers, or are there different kinds of unbelievers, subject to different laws? In attempting to answer this question, Imāmi jurists rely on accounts of 'Alī's behaviour towards the *bughāt*, both at Baṣra and at Ṣiffīn.

As has been pointed out, many Shī'ī traditionists stress that 'Alī showed great kindness to the Baṣrans. One explanation given for this behaviour is that he was following the example set by Muḥammad, who showed mercy to the Meccans after conquering their city in 8/630.<sup>70</sup> 'Alī's lenient behaviour at Baṣra (and, according to some reports, at Ṣiffīn as well) is interpreted as having been the result of practical, as well as humane, considerations: he was afraid that if he took action against his defeated adversaries, retaliatory measures would be taken against his supporters in areas controlled by his enemies.<sup>71</sup> But such explanations could be applied to a war against any category of unbelievers, and are not in themselves proof that 'Alī's attitude to the *bughāt* was different from his attitude to other enemies.

A different method of approaching the issue is to presuppose (as do most Imāmi jurists) that 'Alī treated the Syrians more harshly than he had treated his opponents in the Battle of the Camel, and then to explain this alleged difference in 'Alī's behaviour by reference to what may be termed the "fi'a-theory". According to that theory (which does not apply to non-*bughāt* unbelievers), there are two sets of rules regarding conduct towards *bughāt* on the battle-field: when the *bughāt* can rely for support on additional groups of men (*man lahu fi'a*), their wounded and imprisoned men are to be killed and their *mudbir* (i.e. soldiers fleeing the battlefield) pursued; when they cannot fall back on any additional support (*man lā fi'a lahu*), then their wounded and imprisoned men are to be

<sup>69</sup> See in general *Bihār*, VIII, pp. 454—459, where various earlier sources are quoted.

<sup>70</sup> Al-Kulīnī: *Rawḍat al-kāfī*, p. 180; al-Qādī al-Nu'mān, op. cit., I, p. 459; *Bihār*, VIII, p. 461.

<sup>71</sup> Al-Barqī, op. cit., p. 262; Ibn Bābawayhi: '*Ilal al-sharā'i*', pp. 150, 154, cit. *Bihār*, VIII, pp. 461, 622; al-Kulīnī: *Furū' al-kāfī*, V, p. 33.

spared and their *mudbir* left alone.<sup>72</sup> Mu'āwiya's men belong to the first category, since they could muster reinforcements from Syrian supporters not yet directly involved in the fighting; 'Alī's enemies at Baṣra belong to the second category, since no such help was available to them. Moreover, in the Battle of the Camel Ṭalḥa and al-Zubayr were killed, thus leaving their followers in disarray, whereas at Ṣiffīn Mu'āwiya remained at the head of his forces throughout the battle and showed no sign of wanting to put an end to the fighting.<sup>73</sup>

The notion of *fi'a* has a direct bearing on a related subject: the manner of dividing the spoils. According to Imāmī *fiqh*, a fifth of the spoils captured from non-*bughāt* unbelievers goes to the Imam, and the rest is distributed among the Muslims as follows: the warriors receive the possessions captured in the enemy camp (*mā ḥawāhu 'l-'askar*), and the rest of the community receives all other captured enemy property.<sup>74</sup> In the case of the *bughāt*, in contrast, possessions not captured on the battlefield may not be touched (since the families of the *bughāt* may be loyal Muslims).<sup>75</sup> As to possessions captured in the enemy camp, there are two conflicting views among Imāmī jurists. One group maintains that these possessions are to be distributed among the warriors in the same manner as possessions of other unbelievers, regardless of whether or not the *bughāt* could rely on others for support during the battle.<sup>76</sup> A second group of jurists argues that these possessions may be distributed among the warriors only in the case of *man lahu fi'a*, but not in the case of *man lā fi'a lahu*.<sup>77</sup> Both groups base their claims on 'Alī's alleged behaviour at Baṣra. The first group relies on an account to the effect that 'Alī distributed among his warriors the spoils captured on the battlefield.<sup>78</sup> Another version has it that 'Alī subsequently decided to return these possessions to their original owners; but this is seen by the first group as a particular act of kindness and generosity, which does not establish any legal precedent. Members of the second group claim that 'Alī definitely returned to the *bughāt* at Baṣra their possessions, and that

<sup>72</sup> Al-Kulīnī, *op. cit.*, V, pp. 32—33; al-Qāḍī al-Nu'mān, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 459—460; Abū Ja'far al-Ṭūsī: *K. al-khilāf*, III, p. 166; *id.*: *Al-nihāya*, p. 297; Najm al-Dīn al-Ḥillī: *Al-mukhtaṣar al-nāfi'*, p. 134; Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī: *Tabṣīrat al-muta'allimīn*, I, pp. 238—289. The concept of *fi'a* appears in *Qur'ān* 8/16.

<sup>73</sup> Al-Kishshī, *op. cit.*, p. 190, *cit. Biḥār*, XXI, p. 98; al-Kulīnī, *op. cit.*, V, p. 33, *cit. Biḥār*, VIII, p. 622.

<sup>74</sup> Al-Ṭūsī: *Al-nihāya*, p. 294.

<sup>75</sup> Al-Qāḍī al-Nu'mān: *op. cit.*, I, p. 461.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>77</sup> Najm al-Dīn al-Ḥillī, *op. cit.*, p. 134; *cf. al-Ṭūsī, op. cit.*, p. 297.

<sup>78</sup> Al-Qāḍī al-Nu'mān, *loc. cit.*

this action is to be interpreted as meaning that any other behaviour would be illegal.<sup>79</sup>

Imāmi doctors are at pains to prove that even when legal distinctions are made between laws governing *bughāt* and those governing other unbelievers, these distinctions do not affect the doctrine that all *bughāt* are unbelievers. Al-Shaykh al-Mufid, for instance, distinguishes two different categories of unbelief. He terms the first category *kufr ridda*, "unbelief as a result of apostasy", involving a total rejection of Islam. The second category is *kufr milla*, explained by al-Mufid as referring to someone who is neither a believer, nor even a Muslim in the religious sense, yet who legally belongs to the Islamic community by virtue of his acknowledgement of the *shahādātān*. Hence, from the legal point of view, he is to be treated differently from an unbeliever who is outside the community. In God's eyes, however, a *kāfir millī* is an unbeliever like any other, and as such is condemned to eternal hell-fire.<sup>80</sup> By applying this theory to 'Alī's enemies, al-Mufid can explain 'Alī's lenient behaviour towards some of them, while at the same time insisting that they are unbelievers.

Al-Sharīf al-Murtadā, clearly influenced by the thinking of his teacher al-Mufid, also accepts without question that both classes of unbelievers go to hell, and therefore deals only with the purely legal issue, i.e. how they should be treated in this world. He points out that not all unbelievers are subject to the same laws (*aḥkām al-kufr*); for instance, a non-Muslim in lands not yet conquered by the armies of Islam (sc. a *ḥarbī*) is in a different legal category from a *dhimmī*, although both are unbelievers. In the same way 'Alī's treatment of his enemies, though often different from that customary in dealing with infidels in conquered territories, does not imply that he did not regard them as unbelievers.<sup>81</sup>

To sum up: Imāmi jurists regard the *bughāt* as unbelievers, but maintain that there are certain laws which apply only to them (*aḥkām al-*

<sup>79</sup> See the discussion in *Bihār*, VIII, p. 461. Cf. Muḥammad b. Ḥasan al-Najafī: *Jawāhir al-kalām*. XVI. Najaf 1385, pp. 12—13.

<sup>80</sup> Al-Mufid: *K. al-jamal*, pp. 13—14. Cf. also id.: *Awā'il al-maqālāt*, p. 14. Al-Mufid was not the first to have used these terms, although he gave them a particularly Imāmi colouring. Ibn Taymiyya maintains (*K. al-īmān*. Cairo 1325, pp. 131—132) that the distinction between unbelief which excludes from the community (*yanqulu 'an al-milla*) and unbelief which does not was already known to the Companion Ibn 'Abbās. According to TRITTON (*Muslim theology*. London 1947, p. 39), the Khārijis used *kufr milla* as an equivalent to *kufr shirk*. But this is not the sense in which al-Mufid understood the term.

<sup>81</sup> Al-Sharīf al-Murtadā: *K. al-shāfi fi 'l-īmāma*. Tehran 1884, p. 224; id.: *Jumal al-'ilm wa'l-'amal*. Ed. AḤMAD AL-ḤUSAYNĪ. Najaf 1967, p. 45; Abū Ja'far al-Ṭūsī: *Talkhīṣ al-shāfi*, cit. *Bihār*, VIII, p. 461. Cf. al-Qādī al-Nu'mān, op. cit., I, p. 453.

*bughāt*), and which differ from the laws governing other unbelievers. Some aspects of these laws are in dispute; but there is broad agreement among jurists on two major issues: first, that the *fi'a*-theory (if it applies at all) applies only to the *bughāt*, and second, that possessions found outside the camp of the *bughāt* (*mā 'adā mā ḥawa 'l-'askar*) may not be distributed among the Muslims.

## V

After 'Alī's brief reign and al-Ḥusayn's abortive attempt to return the 'Alids to power, the Imams did not engage in active combat, since in their view their precarious political position dictated a quietistic policy. Rather than provoking the existing régimes through revolts and uprisings (a policy often followed by the Zaydiyya), they channelled their energies into consolidating the Shī'ī heritage and providing spiritual leadership for their community. The suspension of *jihād*, which to them was an inevitable consequence of the new reality, was justified by reference to the need to practise *taqiyya* (precautionary dissimulation).<sup>82</sup> At the same time, the courage displayed by the followers of the Imams in adhering to the Shī'ī faith despite all dangers was seen as raising them to the level of warriors killed in a holy war. This idea is summarised in the words attributed to Muḥammad al-Bāqir, "every believer is a *shahīd*, even if he dies in his bed".<sup>83</sup> Similarly, the Imams themselves are regarded as *shahīds*.<sup>84</sup> *Jihād* itself was considered as being in abeyance until a propitious moment for its revival should present itself. That moment was identified with the return of the concealed Imam as Mahdī.<sup>85</sup> Until the Mahdī's appearance, a state of temporary truce (*hudna*) would continue to exist between the Shī'īs and their enemies.<sup>86</sup> In fact, one of the main reasons given by the Imāmīs for the concealment of the Twelfth Imam has to do with his future role as leader of the *jihād*. According to Abū Ja'far al-Ṭūsī, the rulers of the world know that the Mahdī, unlike his forefathers, would rise against them and would eradicate their unjust

<sup>82</sup> *Bihār*, XV/i, p. 205. Aspects of *taqiyya* in Imāmī Shī'ism are discussed in an article forthcoming in JAOS.

<sup>83</sup> *Bihār*, XIII, p. 140b (quoting al-Ṭūsī's *Amālī*).

<sup>84</sup> Ibn Bābawayhi: *Amālī*, p. 57. The belief that all the Imams died unnaturally as the result of the machinations of their enemies must also have led to their elevation to the rank of *shahīds*.

<sup>85</sup> This doctrine led to pejorative parallels being drawn between the Shī'īs and the Jews, both of whom were said to link resumption of holy war with the arrival of the Messiah (= Mahdī). See I. FRIEDLAENDER: *The heterodoxies of the Shiites in the presentation of Ibn Ḥazm*. II. In: JAOS 29 (1908), p. 95 (quoting al-Sha'bī).

<sup>86</sup> *Bihār*, XVI, p. 233.



rule. They therefore constantly send out spies to find him and have him killed. Moreover, each Imam knew that if he were killed, he would be succeeded by the next Imam; after the Mahdī, however, there will be no Imam. For these reasons the Mahdī has to stay in hiding until the time for him to rise with his sword arrives.<sup>87</sup> A different argument for the prolonged concealment of the Imam was that "in the personal presence of the Imam the obligations that would fall upon men would be more difficult, such as fighting in the *jihād* (holy war) against those opposing the Faith".<sup>88</sup> At the same time, the very belief in the coming of the Mahdī meant that the practice of *taqiyya*, far from representing a defeat for Shī'ism, was merely a stage which had to be passed on the road to ultimate victory.<sup>89</sup>

The vast eschatological literature dealing with the return of the Mahdī as *mujāhid* deserves a separate study, but some outstanding motifs may be briefly mentioned here: the Mahdī's weapon will be the sword Dhu 'l-Faqār, used by both Muḥammad and 'Alī; when the time for his return comes, that sword will call on him to rise and kill the enemies of God. Upon his return, he will be joined by 313 warriors (called *aṣḥāb al-Qā'im*), equalling in number the Muslims who fought at Badr; they will proceed to punish the enemies of 'Alī, including Abū Bakr, 'Umar, 'Uthmān and 'Ā'isha, as well as the murderers of al-Ḥusayn and the Umayyads in general. The Mahdī will conquer the lands of the unbelievers and will invite all scripturaries and polytheists to choose between Islam and the sword; he will then establish a rule of justice and equity.<sup>90</sup>

The belief in the Mahdī as sole leader of the future *jihād* is firmly entrenched in classical Imāmi doctrine. As promulgated by al-Shaykh al-Mufīd, that doctrine stipulates that the concealed Imam does not delegate his authority, and that no one after him can claim to be divinely protected from error and sin (*ma'sūm*).<sup>91</sup> In theory, this would preclude

<sup>87</sup> Al-Ṭūsī: *K. al-ghayba*. Najaf 1385, pp. 61—63, 200, whence *Bihār*, XIII, p. 135. For a Sunnī attack on the Shī'ī concept of the Mahdī see Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya: *Al-manār al-munīf fī 'l-ṣaḥīḥ wa'l-ḍa'īf*. Ed. 'ABD AL-FATTĀḤ ABŪ GHADDA. Beirut 1970, p. 152.

<sup>88</sup> Al-Majlisī: *Ḥayāt al-qulūb*, cit. DONALDSON: *The Shī'ite religion*. London 1933, p. 310.

<sup>89</sup> Cf. al-Nūrī al-Ṭabarsī: *Kashf al-astār*. N. p. 1318, p. 37.

<sup>90</sup> These and numerous other traditions may be found in *Bihār*, XIII, pp. 121 ff., where earlier sources are quoted. One of the oldest of these is the *K. al-ghayba* of Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Nu'mānī (see pp. 121 ff. in the 1318 Tehran edition).

<sup>91</sup> D. SOURDEL: *Les conceptions imāmītes au début du XI<sup>e</sup> siècle d'après le Shaykh al-Mufīd*. In: *Islamic civilisation 950—1150*. Ed. D. S. RICHARDS. Oxford 1973, p. 194; cf. J. ELLASH: *The Ithnā 'asharī-Shī'ī juristic theory of political and legal authority*. In: *SI* 29 (1969), pp. 26—27.

anyone from declaring *jihād*, such declarations being a prerogative of the Imam.<sup>92</sup> Yet already in the late Buwayhid period, the first chinks in this structure become apparent. By that time, the Imam (as well as his four *safirs*, or representatives) had long been gone, and Imāmī leaders must have felt the need to devise alternative methods of conducting the affairs of the community during his absence. Their problem assumed acute proportions when the Buwayhids found themselves under mounting military pressure from the Sunnī Saljuqs. Imāmī jurists must have realised that total suspension of all forms of warfare was becoming a practical impossibility if the Buwayhid régime was to survive. This realisation was probably at the root of the first significant modification of the classical theory of *jihād*, which was formulated by Abū Ja'far al-Ṭūsī, the last great jurist of the period. Al-Ṭūsī stresses that a defensive *jihād* may be carried on even when the Imam is absent. Thus guarding of the frontiers (*ribāṭ*) is always a praiseworthy act, irrespective of whether an Imam is present, and he who vows to go to the frontier areas must always fulfil his vows.<sup>93</sup>

Al-Ṭūsī's views on *jihād* proved the basis for all subsequent Imāmī thinking on the subject. They were taken up and reinforced by leading jurists of the Ilkhān period, which witnessed a revival of Imāmī Shī'ī literature after two centuries of decline. Chief among these jurists are al-Muḥaqqiq Ja'far b. al-Ḥasan Najm al-Dīn al-Ḥillī (d. 676/1277)<sup>94</sup> and Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī. They both declare that people may be summoned to *jihād* by the Imam or by a person appointed by the Imam for that purpose (*man naṣabahū*).<sup>95</sup> This (deliberately?) vague formulation leaves unanswered the question of the identity of the person thus appointed. Yet an indirect answer seems to be provided when they later say that during the Imam's absence, where there is no need to practise *taqiyya*, the duty of executing the prescribed Quranic punishments (*ḥudūd*) devolves upon the doctors (*fuqahā'*).<sup>96</sup> Since the *fuqahā'* thereby

<sup>92</sup> This was the conclusion reached by GOLDZIEHER: *Schī'itisches*. In: ZDMG 64 (1910), p. 531.

<sup>93</sup> Al-Ṭūsī: *Al-nihāya*, pp. 290—291.

<sup>94</sup> Some Shī'ī biographers confused al-Muḥaqqiq al-Ḥillī with Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī by quoting the year 726/1325 (in which Ibn al-Muṭahhar died) as the date in which both died (cf. MUḤSIN AL-ʿAMLĪ: *A'yān al-shī'a*. XV. Damascus 1940, p. 372). This confusion misled S. H. M. JAFRĪ in his biographical note on al-Muḥaqqiq al-Ḥillī (EI<sup>2</sup>, III, p. 390). — Najm al-Dīn's formulations of the rules of *ribāṭ* closely follow those of al-Ṭūsī. See QUERRY, op. cit., I, p. 323; *Al-mukhtaṣar al-nāfi'*, p. 133.

<sup>95</sup> QUERRY, op. cit., I, pp. 323, 352; Najm al-Dīn al-Ḥillī, loc. cit.; Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī: *Tabṣirat al-muta'allimīn*, I, p. 280.

<sup>96</sup> QUERRY, op. cit., I, p. 356; Najm al-Dīn al-Ḥillī, op. cit., p. 139; Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, op. cit., I, pp. 300—301.

effectively serve as the Imam's representatives, it may perhaps be assumed that they are also responsible for summoning the people to *jihād* whenever necessary.

With the advent of the Ṣafavids in the late 9th/15th century, Imāmi 'ulamā' had to contend, for the first time, with Shī'ī rulers who had their own ideas on various doctrinal issues. Thus Shah Ismā'īl (reigned 907/1501—930/1524), whose brand of Shī'ism was imbued with extreme elements, claimed descent from the Imams and hence regarded himself as entitled to all of their prerogatives. These included *jihād* against his most dangerous external foes, the Ottomans.<sup>97</sup> The 'ulamā' did not always acquiesce in these Ṣafavid pretensions to religious leadership, which were often used to further political ends.<sup>98</sup> Consequently, authoritative theological works of that period do not as a rule reproduce the more radical views on *jihād* held by some of the Ṣafavid rulers, but are rather compilations of previous material on the subject. The best known of these works is probably al-Majlisī's *Bihār al-anwār*, which includes numerous references to *jihād*, as well as a separate chapter devoted entirely to it, and comprising mainly *hadīths* and utterances of the Imams.<sup>99</sup>

This situation changed in the late 18th century, when the Ṣafavids were superseded by the Qajar dynasty. From a purely religious viewpoint, the new dynasty (which did not even claim to descend from the Imams) was illegitimate and its leaders could not speak with authority on religious matters. As a result, the 'ulamā' found themselves in the position of sole interpreters of the *sharī'a*, a fact which increased their

<sup>97</sup> "[Ismā'īl's rule was] imbued with the ideal of promoting the cause of the Shī'a and fighting the Sunna both within and without its borders" (D. AYALON: *Gunpowder and firearms in the Mamluk kingdom*. London 1956, p. 109). This Ṣafavid attitude was more than fully reciprocated by the Ottomans, who heaped abuse on the Ṣafavids, branding them as unbelievers and finally declaring *jihād* against them. See J. R. WALSH: *The historiography of Ottoman-Safavid relations in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries*. In: *Historians of the Middle East*. Ed. B. LEWIS and P. M. HOLT. London 1962, pp. 204—206; and in general E. EBERHARD: *Osmanische Polemik gegen die Safaviden im 16. Jahrhundert nach arabischen Handschriften*. Freiburg i.Br. 1970.

<sup>98</sup> According to the evidence of the 17th-century French traveller Jean Chardin, some members of the religious classes believed that the Imam's role should be filled by a divinely-protected *mujtahid*, while others held that only a direct descendant of the Imam had this right. See A. K. S. LAMBTON: *Quis custodiet custodes*. In: SI 6 (1956), p. 132.

<sup>99</sup> See *Bihār*, XXI, pp. 91—117. For an analysis of the *Bihār* see KARL-HEINZ PAMPUS: *Die theologische Enzyklopädie Bihār al-anwār des Muḥammad Bāqir al-Majlisī, ein Beitrag zur Literaturgeschichte der Šī'a in der Safawidenzeit*. Diss. Bonn 1970.

power and influence.<sup>100</sup> Nothing can illustrate this better than the role played by the 'ulamā' in the proclamations of *jihād* in the 19th century. The most famous of these occurred during the Perso-Russian wars of 1808—13 and 1826—28. The anti-Russian campaign was initially set in motion by representatives of the state. Mīrzā Buzurg Abu 'l-Qāsim Qā'im Maqām (d. 1237/1822), who was the minister of Crown Prince 'Abbās Mīrzā (d. 1249/1833), asked and obtained from the leading 'ulamā' *fatwās* sanctioning *jihād*, thus acknowledging that religious approval for the war was essential. The process repeated itself in the second Perso-Russian war. Yet once the movement for *jihād* was set in motion, the 'ulamā' emerged as the real driving force behind it, and when second thoughts arose in court circles as to the advisability of waging war, they were largely swept aside by the wave of popular religious enthusiasm.<sup>101</sup> The *fatwās* issued by the 'ulamā', which were collected in a volume entitled *Risāla-yi jihādīya*, bear witness to a burst of new thinking on the subject.<sup>102</sup> Earlier theories were often elaborated upon, and sometimes even supplanted. As a result, the doctrine of *jihād* as promulgated in the *Risāla* differs markedly from the classical Shī'ī exposition of the subject.<sup>103</sup>

<sup>100</sup> See A. K. S. LAMBTON: *A nineteenth century view of jihād*. In: SI 32 (1970), pp. 184—187. The intricate relationship which existed between the 'ulamā' and the state during the Qajar period is the main subject of H. ALGAR's book, *Religion and state in Iran, 1785—1906*. Berkeley and Los Angeles 1969. Cf. also N. R. KEDDIE: *The roots of the ulama's power in modern Iran*. In: SI 29 (1969), pp. 31—53.

<sup>101</sup> ALGAR, op. cit., pp. 79—90; cf. R. K. RAMAZANI: *The foreign policy of Iran, 1500—1941*. Charlottesville 1966, p. 46. 'Abbās Mīrzā approached the 'ulamā' in order to gain popular support for the war against Russia, but his decision to go to war may in fact have been influenced less by religious conviction than by purely military considerations. See P. W. AVERY: *An enquiry into the outbreak of the second Russo-Persian war, 1826—28*. In: *Iran and Islam*. Ed. C. E. BOSWORTH. Edinburgh 1971, pp. 17—45.

<sup>102</sup> ĀGHĀ BUZURG AL-ṬIHRĀNĪ: *Al-dharī'a ilā taṣānif al-shī'a*. Najaf 1936—8, then Tehran 1941ff., V, pp. 296—298, gives a list of works (in Persian and Arabic) entitled *Al-jihādīya*, and most or all of these must be the *fatwās* issued at that period. Most of them are presumably included in the *Risāla-yi jihādīya*. Unfortunately, I had no access to the original *fatwās*, and could only consult an abridged version of the *Risāla* originally published in Tabriz in 1234/1819. (I used a photographic reprint, kindly sent to me by Dr. J. GURNEY.) The author of the abridgement is probably the second Qā'im Maqām, who was the son of Mīrzā Buzurg (see AL-ṬIHRĀNĪ, op. cit., V, p. 296). His abridgement has the form of an independent treatise, and takes no account of whatever divergencies there may have been between the various responsa. I am indebted to Dr. Y. FRIEDMANN for help in translating various passages from this work.

<sup>103</sup> The views of the leading contemporaneous theologian, Shaykh Ja'far

The *Risāla* (in its abridged form) opens with an explanation of the revived interest in *jihād*: "The practice of *jihād* was neglected and abandoned in the lands of Iran — may God preserve them from misfortune — during the whole period between the concealment of the Imam and the accession, in our own times, of the glorious [Qajar] dynasty. As a result, none of the orthodox '*ulamā*' and leading doctors wrote a work specifically devoted to this subject, and none took it upon himself to expound it. But it has now become clear that the Russians are plotting against Iran, and the Islamic community must once again use the sword of *jihād*; and so the '*ulamā*' of this age — may God increase their likes — have decided that it is their duty to give a full account of the doctrines relating to *jihād*."<sup>104</sup>

The author distinguishes two kinds of *jihād*: offensive *jihād* (called *jihād-i da'vatī*), in which Muslims turn to the lands of the unbelievers and call on them to embrace Islam, having first obtained permission for this action from the Prophet, the Imam or the Imam's deputy (*nā'ib khāṣṣ*);<sup>105</sup> and a defensive *jihād* (called *jihād-i difā'i*), which in turn is divided into four types.<sup>106</sup>

After quoting a number of Quranic passages and several *hadīths* in praise of *jihād*, the author declares: "It is possible to say that *jihād* during the Imam's concealment is more praiseworthy than during his presence."<sup>107</sup> One can hardly imagine a statement more strikingly in Najafī (d. 1228/1813), on the subject of *jihād*, as set out in his *Kashf al-ghīfā*, have been summarised by LAMBTON in: SI 32 (1970), pp. 187—192. Interesting parallels exist between Shaykh Ja'far's exposition and the treatment of the subject in the *Risāla-yi jihādīya*, although there are also important differences. While the author of the *Risāla* is especially interested in clarifying the legal differences between offensive and defensive *jihād*, Shaykh Ja'far's main concern seems to lie in establishing the predominant position of the *mujtahids* and in defining the duties and responsibilities of the reigning sultan.

<sup>104</sup> *Risāla-yi jihādīya*, pp. 2—3.

<sup>105</sup> This term is used in two senses: with reference to the period of the "lesser concealment" it is used to refer to one of the four *safirs* of the concealed Imam; and with reference to the "greater concealment" it signifies a person appointed for a specific task by the *nā'ib 'amm*, i.e. the body of the *mujtahids*. See LAMBTON, op. cit., p. 181, n. 1.

<sup>106</sup> These types are: (i) *jihād* to preserve the territory and community of Islam (*bayzā-i islām*) during an attack by unbelievers; (ii) *jihād* to prevent the unbelievers from gaining control over the persons of Muslims; (iii) *jihād* to repel a particular group of unbelievers when it is feared that they might gain ascendancy over a particular group of Muslims; (iv) *jihād* to evict unbelievers where they have succeeded in conquering Muslim territories. See *Risāla-yi jihādīya*, pp. 9—10.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid., p. 13. According to the author, this claim is based on Shī'ī traditions relating to the verse, "oh Lord our God, we have heard a caller calling [upon us] to believe" (*Qur'ān* 3/193(190)), but I do not know which traditions he has in mind. Most Sunnī and Shī'ī commentators agree in identifying the 'caller' as either Muḥammad or the Qur'ān.

contradiction with the classical view that a *jihād* can only be carried out under the leadership of an Imam. The author then proceeds to explain that in times of danger to the community, the duty of *jihād* turns from *farḍ kifāya* into *farḍ ‘ayn*.<sup>108</sup> The Russian threat is a case in point: all Muslims must leave their families, their children and their property in order to preserve Islam.<sup>109</sup>

The war against Russia belongs to the category of *jihād-i difā‘i*, and the rest of the *Risāla*<sup>110</sup> consists of a list of twelve — always a significant number in Imāmī Shī‘ism — differences between the rules governing defensive and offensive *jihād*. These differences may be summarised as follows:

(i) Whereas an offensive *jihād* may not be waged without the permission of a prophet, an Imam, or a *nā‘ib khāṣṣ* (whether present or absent), a defensive *jihād* depends neither on their permission, nor on the permission of the body of *mujtahids* (the *nā‘ib ‘amm*). If the *mujtahids* are unable to lead the *jihād*, then it becomes the duty of the believers to follow whoever is best equipped to win the war, regardless of his moral qualities. There follows a quotation, presumably from the *Kashf al-ghiṭā’*, in which Shaykh Ja‘far authorises Faṭḥ ‘Alī Shah (reigned 1212/1797—1250/1834) to declare a *jihād* against the Russians.<sup>111</sup>

(ii) Even persons who are exempt from fighting an offensive *jihād* (such as women, slaves, the sick, the old and the insane) must participate in a defensive *jihād*, since such a *jihād* is tantamount to self-preservation.

(iii) Offensive *jihād* is limited to one campaign a year, and is not permitted during the sacred months.<sup>112</sup> *Murābiṭūn* (i.e. those who guard the frontiers) must not participate without specific authorisation from the Imam or the *nā‘ib khāṣṣ*. None of these limitations obtain in defensive *jihād*; it is in fact incumbent upon the *murābiṭūn* to wage *jihād* when faced with imminent attack.

(iv) Levies imposed to finance an offensive *jihād* may not reach a level where they bring about personal hardship and damage. In preparation for a defensive *jihād*, however, the necessary sums must be raised, regardless of the financial sacrifice involved.

(v) The spoils of war (*ghanimat*) obtained during an offensive *jihād* must be distributed among the warriors; but in a defensive *jihād*, if the

<sup>108</sup> Ibid., p. 15. Cf. above, p. 68.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid., p. 16.

<sup>110</sup> Pp. 17—76.

<sup>111</sup> On the political implications of this act see LAMBTON, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

<sup>112</sup> *Al-ashhur al-ḥarām*, i.e. Shawwāl, Dhu ‘l-Qa‘da, Dhu ‘l-Ḥijja, Muḥarram. On this question from the Sunnī point of view cf. KHADDURI, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

spoils are needed in order to finance the continuation of the war on other fronts, then they are to be spent for that purpose and are not to be distributed among the warriors.

(vi) Only in a defensive *jihād* is it permissible to use coercion to obtain the funds needed for the battle.

(vii) The treaties agreed upon between Muslims and *dhimmīs* (such as the payment of *jizya* and the promise of protection) may not be broken by the Muslims during an offensive *jihād*, unless the other side has broken them first; in a defensive *jihād*, however, such treaties may be unilaterally revoked by the Muslims if they deem this necessary.

(viii) Whereas an offensive *jihād* is waged only against unbelievers, in a defensive *jihād* no distinction is drawn between unbelievers and those Muslims who resemble them in their greed for power and wealth. Such Muslims, who aid the unbelievers by divulging military secrets and by spreading sedition, are not part of the Muslim community, are regarded as belonging to the category of a *murtadd fiṭrī*,<sup>113</sup> and are to be killed.<sup>114</sup>

(ix) In a defensive *jihād*, it is not obligatory, before attacking the enemy, to call upon him to embrace Islam (thus losing the element of surprise).<sup>115</sup> If necessary, believers are allowed to wear — even during the prescribed prayers — clothes of a kind normally forbidden to them (e.g. garments made from the hide of animals whose flesh may not be consumed, or garments made with gold threads). No such dispensations apply in an offensive war.

(x) In an offensive *jihād*, care must be taken that the unbelievers do not outnumber the believers by more than two to one; in a defensive *jihād*, on the other hand, the number of the enemy is not to be taken into account.<sup>116</sup>

(xi) Various stratagems, which in an offensive *jihād* are frowned upon, are allowed in a defensive war. These include surprise attack, attack at night, using weapons such as muskets, pistols, carbines and grenades, uprooting trees, releasing water to flood the unbelievers or preventing water from reaching them so that they die of thirst, and so on.

<sup>113</sup> A term referring to an apostate who was born as a Muslim. The distinction between such an apostate and an apostate who was not born as a Muslim (*murtadd ghayr fiṭrī*) was already known to the Meccan theologian 'Aṭā' b. Abī Rabāḥ (d. 115/733); cf. GOLDZIEHER: *Muslim studies*, II, pp. 199—200, and in general the article on 'Aṭā' by J. SCHACHT, in: *EI*<sup>2</sup>, I, p. 730.

<sup>114</sup> This clause may have been directed against those elements who hesitated to join the call for *jihād* against the Russians.

<sup>115</sup> Cf. KHADDURI, *op. cit.*, pp. 96—98. For the formula of this *du'ā'* see al-Kulīnī, *op. cit.*, V, p. 36.

<sup>116</sup> Cf. KHADDURI, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

(xii) In an offensive *jihād*, it is forbidden to violate a cease-fire (*muhādana*) once it has been agreed upon; in a defensive *jihād* this is allowed, as long as the danger from the unbelievers has not been completely averted.

The significance of the *Risāla-yi jihādīya* is two-fold: firstly, it established the religious leadership as the de facto vicegerents of the concealed Imam; and secondly, it reasserted the central position of the duty of *jihād* in Imāmī jurisprudence. While the ultimate victory of Shī'ism continued to be linked to the coming of the Mahdī, the pursuance of *jihād-i difā'i* could henceforth be regarded as a legitimate means of defending the Imāmī community. Viewed in perspective, the development of the Imāmī doctrine of *jihād*, from its earliest stages up to its manifestation in the *Risāla*, attests to the remarkable resilience of Imāmī thinking, which could adapt itself to vastly different historical situations without compromising the foundations upon which it was built.<sup>117</sup>

<sup>117</sup> I am most grateful to Dr. F. H. STEWART for his painstaking revision of the text of this article and for his numerous suggestions relating to both style and contents.